Sometimes we need a little reminder of what's going on in Syria, which has taken to the back-burner in the U.S. media in recent months. Briefly: the Syrian regime has made headway in the Qalamoun mountains north of Damascus, although it's been contested hotly. Maaloula, for instance, has fallen back into rebel hands. The regime has been successful in capturing Qara, Deir Atiyeh, and is now pushing on Al-Nabk. These are all cities on the strategic Damascus-Homs highway, which the regime seeks to keep open and the rebels hope to cut. The reason for the road's importance is simple: not only does it connect two important urban centers to one another, but it also is the regime's outlet to the Alawi heartland on the Mediterranean coast: the environs of Latakia. The Assad family itself originates in Qardaha, a village not far from Latakia. The regime's clearing of the highway is important because, in the event that the Assad regime falls (this looks less and less likely every day), it's an escape route. The regime, with the significant assistance of Hezbollah, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Iraqi Shiites, has also made headway in the suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo, Syria's two most important cities.
The Syrian regime has followed an intelligent strategy in the course of this war. Instead of stretching itself thin and trying to defend everything at once, as it was doing initially, it has concentrated its forces on keeping several important cities, especially Damascus and Aleppo. This has allowed the spread of Islamist groups in other parts of the country, particularly in the northeast, but the regime has been able to hone in on what is truly important. Keep the major cities, clear the major arteries, and, yes, starve the enemy, and innocent people, into submission. I never said the regime was nice, just smart. Assad was able to cross the international community's red line, agree to a deal to destroy his chemical weapons, and move on. As it stands, 99% of the dead in this conflict have been killed with conventional means: gunfire, artillery, helicopter gunships, and so on. While the chemical weapons were always a fear of the West, in this particular conflict, Bashar al-Assad does not need them. If he can starve out the opposition, let them continue to bicker with one another, and maintain his alliance, he should be able to weather the storm. The fact will remain, however, that he will have next to zero cachet among the Syrian people, with the exception of religious minorities, particularly the Alawis; members of his military/intelligence/political apparatus; and members of the business community, including and especially wealthy Sunnis, who he has managed to keep on his side. Syria is, and will continue to be, however, a scarred country and a fractured polity. I honestly wonder if the best solution would not be partition. Syria itself, like many of the states of the modern Middle East, is an artificial state.
It can be broken down into a few important zones:
1. Jabal Druze - "Mountain of the Druze", in the environs of Suwayda in southern Syria bordering Jordan, also known as the Hauran. This region is a volcanic plateau that is, unsurprisingly, populated largely by Druzes. The Druzes are a sect that has split off from Islam. They are intensely exclusivist: there is no conversion, and very little toleration for intermarriage. The Druzes have traditionally sought areas in the Levant where they can hold off more powerful forces (the tried and true practice of the region's minorities), and they now predominate in areas such as the Hauran, the Carmel region of Israel, the Golan Heights, and Mount Lebanon. In order to maintain internal cohesion and prevent the backlash of stronger enemies, the Druzes have a tradition of being loyal to whoever is in power: they are loyal Zionists in Israel, backers of Assad in Syria, awkwardly split in the Golan Heights (because Israel is in power now but what if the Golan is returned to Syria at some point), and they are a perpetual ping pong ball in the labyrinthine politics of Lebanon. Always trying to keep ahead of the curve, Lebanon's Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, switches his stance on Syria once every few years, even though Hafez al-Assad killed his father in 1977.
2. The Damascus-Aleppo corridor - this is the heart of Syria, and the heartland of its Sunni Arab majority. It contains Syria's four largest cities (Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo) and represents the industrial and commercial backbone of the nation (Homs is industrial, Aleppo in particular commercial).
3. The Syrian Desert - scarcely populated, but with nice ruins (and torture chambers)!
4. The Golan Heights - in the southwest of Syria, not far from Damascus, this is a Syrian territory currently occupied by Israel. As is well known, it was captured in 1967 and successfully defended by Israel in 1973. It's been quiet since 1974, with a few exceptions of random mortar and gun fire during the current civil war, and when the Assad regime bussed out protesters in June 2011. The region's main city is Quneitra, which the Syrian regime keeps in ruins to showcase "Zionist barbarity" (it is literally a tourist attraction with this purpose). The region is supposedly the focus of the Assad regime, but this is all politics: Assad's "resistance" against Israel was once the card he could play to placate his people; the pining for the Golan was essential to his regime, although not its actual return. Now, I am not sure where that issue stands, to be perfectly honest. It's not like Assad has to worry about placating Syria's people anymore; after all, he has been shooting them like rabid dogs for two and a half years.
5. The northeast - this is part of the Jazira region, which also encompasses southeastern Turkey and northwestern Iraq. The Euphrates River runs through it. It has a heavy Kurdish population and has, in parts, become sort of a Wild West for Islamists. This is particularly the case in al-Raqqa, an important city that is run by the thuggish Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), an Al-Qaeda affiliate. Because of the regime's (intentional) non-presence in northeastern Syria, there is a power vacuum. The Kurds and the Islamists are the main antagonists here, and there have been clashes.
6. The Latakia District - this district, although not the city of Latakia itself, is predominantly Alawi. Brief historical context: the Alawis are a secretive sect that is a spin-off of Islam but also follows Christian rituals, including the taking of the Eucharist and the celebration of Easter. After the First World War, there was briefly an autonomous Alawi territory (from the beginning of the French Mandate, in 1920, until 1936, when the territory was brought back into the larger Syrian fold). The French followed a policy whereby they recruited religious minorities, including Druzes and Alawis, to fight in their colonial forces. This began a tradition whereby the Alawis, traditionally discriminated against and treated like second-class citizens, were able to serve in the military with distinction. Other than being sharecroppers answering to Sunni landlords, or having their daughters serve as maids or prostitutes to the elites, this was really their only avenue. Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez, followed this path and entered the Homs Military Academy, eventually leading the Syrian Air Force. After a series of coups, Hafez al-Assad became the most prominent of Syria's Baathists (a pan-Arab political group that was supported by many religious minorities because of its emphasis on Arab unity and de-emphasis on Islam). The problem is that Syria remains 2/3 or 3/4 Sunni, and many of them do not recognize the Alawis as Muslims at all. Assad pére was able to attain important political cover in the early 1970s when Imam Musa al-Sadr, an important Iranian cleric in Lebanon, declared the Alawis to be legitimate Shiites. Nonetheless, the Syrian regime has had consistently to be the loudest anti-Israel voice in the Arab camp; it could not afford to be outflanked in this regard. Being the loudest voice was born of the regime's weak claims of legitimacy. A once-despised and -discriminated against people had taken control of Syria, and they would not be letting go, as they very clearly displayed in 1982, when Hafez al-Assad's brother Rifaat decimated the city of Hama, killing anywhere from 10,000-40,000 people. After that, there was basically not a peep of protest until 2011. And here we are. This is a battle to the death, in a region that is not "post-ethnic" or "post-religious" or any of those feel-good things we like to think we are in the West. Assad has nowhere to go. He either stays in power, or he falls, and his people fall with him. In his thinking, if he falls, the Sunnis will commit genocide against the Alawis. And with reliable supporters, the international community off his back because of the chemical weapons deal, and breathing room after his patron Iran signed the nuclear deal with the P5+1, Assad has absolutely zero reason to negotiate.
Because of the artificiality of the state, with so many different sects (in a part of the world where, yes, there are multiple cultures, but no, there are no tingly feelings about it), it sits on a volcano (like next-door Lebanon, which is very similar in many respects). Until the mid-20th century, "Syria" always represented a very broad, vague geographic area: "Bilad al-Sham" encompassed present day Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestinian territories, Jordan, parts of Turkey and Iraq, etc. The major port that fed Damascus was Beirut, now inconveniently in a different country. The traditional trade route of Aleppo to Mosul, in northern Iraq, was similarly made inconvenient. The current political actors in Syria, and the region, have a lot at stake in these modern borders, and Assad will not relinquish them and be satisfied as a petty dictator in some tiny Alawi statelet in northwestern Syria. The borders of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, etc are similarly arbitrary. I am not saying that this is wrong. Most of the world's borders are arbitrary, and it is impossible to draw a line that will leave all of people X on one side and all of people Y on the other. Yet it also helps to clarify some of the issues with which we are dealing when confronting modern Syrian (and regional) politics.
The Syrian regime has followed an intelligent strategy in the course of this war. Instead of stretching itself thin and trying to defend everything at once, as it was doing initially, it has concentrated its forces on keeping several important cities, especially Damascus and Aleppo. This has allowed the spread of Islamist groups in other parts of the country, particularly in the northeast, but the regime has been able to hone in on what is truly important. Keep the major cities, clear the major arteries, and, yes, starve the enemy, and innocent people, into submission. I never said the regime was nice, just smart. Assad was able to cross the international community's red line, agree to a deal to destroy his chemical weapons, and move on. As it stands, 99% of the dead in this conflict have been killed with conventional means: gunfire, artillery, helicopter gunships, and so on. While the chemical weapons were always a fear of the West, in this particular conflict, Bashar al-Assad does not need them. If he can starve out the opposition, let them continue to bicker with one another, and maintain his alliance, he should be able to weather the storm. The fact will remain, however, that he will have next to zero cachet among the Syrian people, with the exception of religious minorities, particularly the Alawis; members of his military/intelligence/political apparatus; and members of the business community, including and especially wealthy Sunnis, who he has managed to keep on his side. Syria is, and will continue to be, however, a scarred country and a fractured polity. I honestly wonder if the best solution would not be partition. Syria itself, like many of the states of the modern Middle East, is an artificial state.
It can be broken down into a few important zones:
1. Jabal Druze - "Mountain of the Druze", in the environs of Suwayda in southern Syria bordering Jordan, also known as the Hauran. This region is a volcanic plateau that is, unsurprisingly, populated largely by Druzes. The Druzes are a sect that has split off from Islam. They are intensely exclusivist: there is no conversion, and very little toleration for intermarriage. The Druzes have traditionally sought areas in the Levant where they can hold off more powerful forces (the tried and true practice of the region's minorities), and they now predominate in areas such as the Hauran, the Carmel region of Israel, the Golan Heights, and Mount Lebanon. In order to maintain internal cohesion and prevent the backlash of stronger enemies, the Druzes have a tradition of being loyal to whoever is in power: they are loyal Zionists in Israel, backers of Assad in Syria, awkwardly split in the Golan Heights (because Israel is in power now but what if the Golan is returned to Syria at some point), and they are a perpetual ping pong ball in the labyrinthine politics of Lebanon. Always trying to keep ahead of the curve, Lebanon's Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, switches his stance on Syria once every few years, even though Hafez al-Assad killed his father in 1977.
2. The Damascus-Aleppo corridor - this is the heart of Syria, and the heartland of its Sunni Arab majority. It contains Syria's four largest cities (Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo) and represents the industrial and commercial backbone of the nation (Homs is industrial, Aleppo in particular commercial).
3. The Syrian Desert - scarcely populated, but with nice ruins (and torture chambers)!
4. The Golan Heights - in the southwest of Syria, not far from Damascus, this is a Syrian territory currently occupied by Israel. As is well known, it was captured in 1967 and successfully defended by Israel in 1973. It's been quiet since 1974, with a few exceptions of random mortar and gun fire during the current civil war, and when the Assad regime bussed out protesters in June 2011. The region's main city is Quneitra, which the Syrian regime keeps in ruins to showcase "Zionist barbarity" (it is literally a tourist attraction with this purpose). The region is supposedly the focus of the Assad regime, but this is all politics: Assad's "resistance" against Israel was once the card he could play to placate his people; the pining for the Golan was essential to his regime, although not its actual return. Now, I am not sure where that issue stands, to be perfectly honest. It's not like Assad has to worry about placating Syria's people anymore; after all, he has been shooting them like rabid dogs for two and a half years.
5. The northeast - this is part of the Jazira region, which also encompasses southeastern Turkey and northwestern Iraq. The Euphrates River runs through it. It has a heavy Kurdish population and has, in parts, become sort of a Wild West for Islamists. This is particularly the case in al-Raqqa, an important city that is run by the thuggish Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), an Al-Qaeda affiliate. Because of the regime's (intentional) non-presence in northeastern Syria, there is a power vacuum. The Kurds and the Islamists are the main antagonists here, and there have been clashes.
6. The Latakia District - this district, although not the city of Latakia itself, is predominantly Alawi. Brief historical context: the Alawis are a secretive sect that is a spin-off of Islam but also follows Christian rituals, including the taking of the Eucharist and the celebration of Easter. After the First World War, there was briefly an autonomous Alawi territory (from the beginning of the French Mandate, in 1920, until 1936, when the territory was brought back into the larger Syrian fold). The French followed a policy whereby they recruited religious minorities, including Druzes and Alawis, to fight in their colonial forces. This began a tradition whereby the Alawis, traditionally discriminated against and treated like second-class citizens, were able to serve in the military with distinction. Other than being sharecroppers answering to Sunni landlords, or having their daughters serve as maids or prostitutes to the elites, this was really their only avenue. Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez, followed this path and entered the Homs Military Academy, eventually leading the Syrian Air Force. After a series of coups, Hafez al-Assad became the most prominent of Syria's Baathists (a pan-Arab political group that was supported by many religious minorities because of its emphasis on Arab unity and de-emphasis on Islam). The problem is that Syria remains 2/3 or 3/4 Sunni, and many of them do not recognize the Alawis as Muslims at all. Assad pére was able to attain important political cover in the early 1970s when Imam Musa al-Sadr, an important Iranian cleric in Lebanon, declared the Alawis to be legitimate Shiites. Nonetheless, the Syrian regime has had consistently to be the loudest anti-Israel voice in the Arab camp; it could not afford to be outflanked in this regard. Being the loudest voice was born of the regime's weak claims of legitimacy. A once-despised and -discriminated against people had taken control of Syria, and they would not be letting go, as they very clearly displayed in 1982, when Hafez al-Assad's brother Rifaat decimated the city of Hama, killing anywhere from 10,000-40,000 people. After that, there was basically not a peep of protest until 2011. And here we are. This is a battle to the death, in a region that is not "post-ethnic" or "post-religious" or any of those feel-good things we like to think we are in the West. Assad has nowhere to go. He either stays in power, or he falls, and his people fall with him. In his thinking, if he falls, the Sunnis will commit genocide against the Alawis. And with reliable supporters, the international community off his back because of the chemical weapons deal, and breathing room after his patron Iran signed the nuclear deal with the P5+1, Assad has absolutely zero reason to negotiate.
Because of the artificiality of the state, with so many different sects (in a part of the world where, yes, there are multiple cultures, but no, there are no tingly feelings about it), it sits on a volcano (like next-door Lebanon, which is very similar in many respects). Until the mid-20th century, "Syria" always represented a very broad, vague geographic area: "Bilad al-Sham" encompassed present day Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestinian territories, Jordan, parts of Turkey and Iraq, etc. The major port that fed Damascus was Beirut, now inconveniently in a different country. The traditional trade route of Aleppo to Mosul, in northern Iraq, was similarly made inconvenient. The current political actors in Syria, and the region, have a lot at stake in these modern borders, and Assad will not relinquish them and be satisfied as a petty dictator in some tiny Alawi statelet in northwestern Syria. The borders of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, etc are similarly arbitrary. I am not saying that this is wrong. Most of the world's borders are arbitrary, and it is impossible to draw a line that will leave all of people X on one side and all of people Y on the other. Yet it also helps to clarify some of the issues with which we are dealing when confronting modern Syrian (and regional) politics.
No comments:
Post a Comment